INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH CENTER

On the Road to Antalya: COP31 Agenda

2 October 2026

1. The 2026 United Nations Climate Change Conference will take place from 9 to 20 November 2026 in Antalya, Türkiye. This year, the event is being organized under a unique co-leadership model.[1] Türkiye will serve as the host country and organizer, while Australia will hold the negotiation presidency, sharing this role with Pacific Island States.[2] However, this dual governance structure creates potential for internal tensions, driven by the countries' differing perspectives on certain key agenda items.[3]

2. The upcoming climate session comes at a pivotal moment when the international climate regime shifts from the stage of planning and declarations to the phase of monitoring their practical implementation. The 31st session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (**COP31**) will officially launch the second cycle of the Global Stocktake (**GST**), the outcomes of which are scheduled to be presented at COP33 in 2028.[4] As a mechanism of the Paris Agreement designed to assess global progress, the second GST cycle could act as a catalyst for change over the next few years and predetermine the dynamics of the negotiating tracks.

3. Below is an overview of the official agenda[5] and the main themes of the negotiation process at COP31.

Recommended citation: Kononovich, I. V. (2026). *On the Road to Antalya: COP31 Agenda*. International and Comparative Law Research Center. https://doi.org/10.65556/VGHM3056

[1] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2025). Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities. URL

[2] The officially appointed COP31 President-Designate will be Murat Kurum, Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change of Türkiye. The role of the COP31 President of Negotiations has been assigned to Chris Bowen, Minister for Climate Change and Energy of Australia. This role grants him exclusive authority over the negotiating agenda, encompassing agenda setting, drafting text, and appointing co-facilitators. URL

[3] For instance, at COP30 in Belém, Türkiye opposed accelerating the implementation of the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels Roadmap (TAFF Roadmap), whereas Australia supported the initiative. Such a divergence creates risks for achieving a consensus within their co-leadership framework.

[4] The Global Stocktake (GST) is an ambition-raising mechanism established under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement to periodically assess countries' collective progress toward achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, including temperature stabilization, adaptation, and means of implementation (finance and technology). The second GST cycle will be officially launched at COP31 and will proceed in three phases: data collection and preparation (2026–2027), technical assessment of progress (until the end of 2027), and the consideration of outputs to inform the final political outcome in 2028. URL. Parallel to this, dialogues on implementing the outputs of the first GST will take place in 2026 and 2027, with their synthesis reports serving as inputs for the second GST cycle (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2026). *Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its seventh session, held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its seventh session.* (**FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1**). Decision 3/CMA.7, paras. 5, 8). URL

[5] UNFCCC. Executive Secretary. (2026). *Provisional agenda and annotations* (FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. URL

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1. National Mitigation Ambitions

4. Although most states have submitted[6] their updated nationally determined contributions (**NDCs**) for 2025–2026, the level of climate ambition reflected in these commitments remains insufficient to achieve the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.[7] The key challenge now lies in the implementation of measures to meet the declared targets.

5. The Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (**MWP**),[8] launched at COP27 in 2022, remains the only official agenda item dedicated to implementing mitigation measures. The programme was created to bridge the critical gap between current national plans and the Paris Agreement temperature goal by urgently scaling up ambition and practical mitigation action by 2030. However, the programme's mandate explicitly excludes the binding prescription of new targets, making its overall effectiveness entirely dependent on the readiness of states to voluntarily integrate interstate discussions into their national policies.

6. A fundamental challenge facing the MWP remains the lack of consensus regarding its nature and working modalities. A group of developed states views the programme as a legitimate instrument to exert pressure on countries with low climate ambitions and insists on incorporating the GST outcomes into final COP decisions. Conversely, developing countries view the MWP solely as a supportive platform for exchanging experience and best practices. These disagreements have stalled the negotiation process, resulted in a lack of substantial practical outcomes since the inception of the programme, and deepened concerns about its effectiveness. A decision on the future of the MWP is expected at the upcoming session in Antalya. Given the lack of progress at the Bonn intersessional negotiations in June 2026, the parties will essentially have to restart the discussion from their initial positions.

2. Adaptation

7. In recent years, adaptation issues have gained increasing prominence on the agenda, shifting the focus from traditional discussions on climate change mitigation. A key milestone in this process was the agreement on a set of 59 indicators to assess progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation (**GGA**).[9] Starting from 2026, the GGA track has entered a fundamentally new, practical phase of implementation, launching the pilot deployment and testing of the approved metrics at national levels, which is scheduled to run until November 2027. To provide methodological support for this process, including metadata elaboration and methodological harmonization, the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) are to establish a Special Technical Group starting in 2026.[10] The primary objective of this phase is to establish the institutional foundation enabling countries to submit

[6] According to data as of the end of the second quarter of 2026, 147 countries have submitted their updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs), covering over 75% of global emissions. URL

[7] Under one of the most optimistic scenarios considered by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which assumes full implementation of NDCs coupled with long-term net-zero strategies, global warming estimates peak at approximately 1.8 °C. Across all analyzed scenarios, median projections indicate that global temperatures will surpass the 1.5 °C threshold within the next decade. URL

[8] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2023). *Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan* (FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/10/Add.1). Decision 1/CMA.4, paras. 2-5. URL

[9] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2025). *Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its seventh session, held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its seventh session* (**FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.2**). Decision 12/CMA.7, para. 6. URL

[10] Furthermore, to facilitate the operationalization of adaptation indicators for the 2026–2027 period, the Belém-Addis Adaptation Vision (BAVA) was developed. This two-year process aims to formulate guiding principles for implementing adaptation indicators, drawing upon the technical work of the Special Technical Group, the practical experience of countries gained through pilot testing, and the integration of these targets into climate reporting. URL

their first adaptation data within national reporting by COP32 in 2027.[11] Additionally, the indicator data collected in 2026–2027 will set the stage for the second GST cycle.[12]

8. Despite the progress achieved in Belém, countries failed to reach a consensus on the composition and funding of the Special Technical Group during the Bonn intersessional meetings in 2026. Furthermore, disagreements emerged among states regarding the language referencing a tripling of adaptation finance by 2035.[13] Developed countries opposed including this provision in the draft decision, insisting that it be discussed within financial tracks, whereas developing countries emphasized the necessity of considering the means of implementation (**MOI**)[14] as a core element of the GGA. As a result, the text was not adopted in Bonn,[15] meaning that the discussions will essentially have to restart from initial positions at COP31 in November. If delays in deploying adaptation indicators persist in Antalya, including the establishment of the Special Technical Group, it may prevent a comprehensive overview of global adaptation progress from being achieved until the next GST in 2033.

3. Climate Finance

9. Despite significant progress on the finance agenda[16] over the past few years, there are still systemic contradictions. Access to financial resources for adaptation in developing countries remains a highly pressing issue, continuing to stall progress on the adaptation track.

10. Discussions regarding the inclusion of an agenda item on the Work Programme under Article 9.1, in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement[17] alongside the future modalities for financial debates under this framework, are likely to be among the most sensitive at COP31 and will define the overall dynamics of the negotiations in Antalya. In June 2026, during the initial meetings in Bonn, disagreements among countries emerged regarding the expansion of the donor base, as well as the structure and channels of funding.[18]

11. In 2026, the negotiations will be set against the backdrop of new reports by the Standing Committee on Finance (**SCF**). Prior to the session, the Committee plans[19] to release the Seventh Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (7th BA), which will provide official data on climate finance flows for 2023–2024, as well as the third report assessing progress made by developed countries towards the goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion per year.[20] The

[11] FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.2. Decision 12/CMA.7, para. 6. URL

[12] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2025). *Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its sixth session, held in Baku from 11 to 24 November 2024. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its sixth session* (FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/17/Add.1). Decision 3/CMA.6, para. 23. URL

[13] FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1. Decision 1/CMA.7, para. 54. URL

[14] Under the UNFCCC, means of implementation encompass financial resources, technology development and transfer mechanisms, and capacity-building tools required by countries to fulfill their climate commitments.

[15] For more details on the progress of the GGA negotiation process in Bonn in 2026, refer to the ICLRC material. URL

[16] In 2024, at COP29, the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) was agreed. URL. In 2025, a target to triple adaptation finance by 2035 was approved, and a two-year Work Programme on Climate Finance under Article 9.1 in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement was established. URL

[17] In June 2026, the COP30 Presidency sent an official letter requesting the inclusion of a dedicated item on the provisional agenda of COP31 in Antalya to consider matters related to the work programme. URL. Furthermore, a separate item dedicated to the work programme officially emerged in the draft agenda of the CMA. URL

[18] For more details on the progress of the climate finance negotiating process in Bonn in 2026, refer to the ICLRC material. URL

[19] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2025). *Report of the Standing Committee on Finance* (FCCC/CP/2025/9–FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/13), Annex IV: *Workplan of the Standing Committee on Finance for 2026*. URL

[20] Kononovich, I. V., Khlebnova, A. D. (2025). *Climate Finance: Concept, Architecture, and the UNFCCC Agenda*. International and Comparative Law Research Center. URL

document will assess the fulfillment of this commitment up to and including 2024, serving as a basis for financial discussions between donor and recipient countries.

12. Additionally, the activities of the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, particularly the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (**FRLD**), will be at the center of discussions at COP31. The fund is scheduled to transition from its pilot phase to a full-scale, long-term financing cycle starting in 2027.[21] Previously, at COP30 in Belém, the parties formally inaugurated the call for funding proposals under the Barbados Implementation Modalities (**BIM**), which was officially launched with a total funding volume of $342 million.[22] COP31 will review the initial outcomes of the BIM and approve long-term rules for the allocation of FRLD resources.[23] As of August 2026, the total pledged contributions to the FRLD stood at approximately $822.71 million, less than 60% of which is available for disbursement.[24] The current volume of the Fund's resources remains disproportionate to the funding requests submitted by developing countries.[25]

13. Attention at COP31 will also be on the future of the Adaptation Fund (**AF**). Amid the general discussion on tripling adaptation finance, the AF faces a critical shortfall due to donor countries failing to deliver on their pledged financial commitments,[26] which jeopardizes the implementation of approved projects in developing countries.[27] Furthermore, discussions regarding the transition of the AF to operate exclusively under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) will continue at COP31, which will require the conclusion of interim institutional frameworks with the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). Developing countries will insist on the establishment of stable and predictable sources of funding for the AF, including a direct share of proceeds from the market mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

4. Other Agenda Items

14. Just transition issues are expected to be at the center of discussions at COP31 and have been included among the priorities of the COP31 presidency.[28] The first review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Just Transition Work Programme (**JTWP**) is scheduled for completion, following which the parties will update its mandate.[29] A significant step toward the institutional development of this negotiation track was the establishment of the Just Transition Mechanism

[21] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (2026). *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirtieth session, held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its thirtieth session* (**FCCC/CP/2025/12/Add.1**). Decision 4/CP.30, para. 12. URL

[22] The Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) is a two-year pilot platform (2025–2026) designed to allocate targeted grant support to the most vulnerable developing countries within the loss and damage climate track, established to practically test and optimize direct access channels to climate finance. Under the BIM, countries can request grants ranging from $5 million to $20 million per application. A special focus is placed on the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS), to which at least 50% of BIM resources must be allocated. URL

[23] FCCC/CP/2025/12/Add.1. Decision 4/CP.30, para. 13. URL

[24] Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). (2026). *Report of the Board to the Conference of the Parties at its thirty-first session and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its eighth session* (FRLD/B.9/20/Rev.1). URL

[25] As of June 2026, the initial funding requests from developing countries submitted for consideration under the BIM, but not yet approved, totaled $2.8 billion. URL

[26] Against an officially approved annual resource mobilization target of $300 million for 2025, the Adaptation Fund (AF) was able to mobilize only $133 million during its recent fundraising rounds, fulfilling less than half of the plan. URL

[27] The demand for funding from the AF continues to rise. The active pipeline of project and programme proposals submitted over the past 18 months, but not yet approved, reached $1.06 billion. URL

[28] Official letter from Murat Kurum, Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change of Türkiye, 13 April 2026. URL

[29] FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/16/Add.1. Decision 3/CMA.5 (COP28, Dubai). URL. This decision laid the foundation for the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). The Terms of Reference for the first review of the programme were provisionally agreed in Bonn in 2026.

(JTM) in Belém in 2025.[30] Its primary task is to transform the programme from an exclusively deliberative platform into a practical tool for supporting countries. The operationalization of the new mechanism, including the coordination of its working modalities and launch timelines, will also be discussed at COP31 in Antalya.

15. In 2026, technology issues came to the forefront for the first time in many years. At COP31, a decision is expected regarding the extension of the mandate and the revision of the functions of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the host of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (**CTCN**) until 2041.[31] Concurrently, attention will focus on the operationalization of the Belém Technology Implementation Programme (**BTIP**), which aims to support the technological priorities of developing countries. Following the completion of the submission period for national proposals in July 2026, the thematic focus of the programme's first global intersessional dialogue, scheduled for June 2027, is expected to be approved in Antalya. The global assessment report on the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer (**PSP**)[32] is also expected to be considered in Antalya.[33] Given the completion of the final PSP pilot projects in June 2026, the parties will review the outcomes of the programme's long-term operation at COP31 and identify opportunities to integrate its institutional experience into the BTIP architecture.[34]

16. The deadline for countries to submit their second Biennial Transparency Reports (**BTRs**) falls in December 2026.[35] These reports include detailed information on national anthropogenic emission inventories by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, progress in implementing and achieving NDC targets, mitigation measures deployed, climate change impacts, and adaptation, as well as the support provided, needed, or received (technology, finance, and capacity-building). BTRs serve as a data source for the main negotiation tracks[36] while enabling countries to officially record their achievements and needs within climate policy. Furthermore, data from the updated BTRs will inform the second GST cycle.

[30] FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1. Decision 2/CMA.7, para. 25. URL

[31] FCCC/CP/2025/12/Add.1. Decision 10/CP.30, paras. 1-2. URL

[32] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (24 April 2026). *Evaluation of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer: Report by the secretariat* (FCCC/SBI/2026/9). URL

[33] The PSP was established in 2007 with the support and funding of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to scale up investment in environmentally sound technologies for developing countries, including by conducting technology needs assessments (TNAs), financing pilot technology projects, and disseminating successful GEF practices. A report from April 2026 indicates that nearly all pilot projects under the Poznan Programme have been completed. Developed countries sought to use this report to close the chapter on the programme. Conversely, developing countries blocked the process in Bonn in 2026, demanding that the entire successful financial experience of the PSP be integrated into new mechanisms without losing access to GEF funding.

[34] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (27 March 2025). *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-ninth session, held in Baku from 11 to 22 November 2024. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-ninth session* (FCCC/CP/2024/11/Add.1). Decision 9/CP.29, paras. 2-3. URL

[35] The BTRs are the central tool for providing information under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), established by Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. The objective of this mechanism is to ensure the transparency and comparability of climate actions across all countries, clearly demonstrating the actual progress of states in fulfilling their climate commitments and adapting their economies. URL. Starting in 2024, countries are required to submit BTRs every two years in accordance with the agreed Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPG). URL

[36] For instance, needs-related data from BTRs can be utilized by the operating entities of the Financial and Technology Mechanisms for strategic planning, coordinating international support, and targeting resource allocation.

17. In 2026, alongside the second BTR submission cycle,[37] the submission of initial reports (**IRs**)[38] by countries intending to participate in the mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement will accelerate. Starting in 2025, a formal assessment process for these submissions was initiated under the UNFCCC,[39] with subsequent expert review reports made publicly available on the portal.[40] A substantial pool of these reports[41] is expected to be finalized by COP31, serving as a benchmark for national regulators and identifying common methodological errors made by early movers. Looking ahead, this will help systematize practices for rectifying technical and methodological discrepancies in climate reporting.

18. Furthermore, discussions will continue regarding the funding of the core technical infrastructure under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. During the Bonn sessions in 2026, a report[42] on the Secretariat's budget deficit for these purposes was considered in detail. Disagreements among states persist regarding the funding mechanisms. Developed countries insist that the maintenance of the Article 6.2 infrastructure should be partially offset through voluntary contributions from market participants, whereas developing countries are concerned that additional fees could restrict the inflow of climate investment into their economies.

5. On the Margins of the Negotiation Agenda

19. The official launch of two global roadmaps, initiated under the auspices of the Brazilian presidency in 2025 and aimed at the practical implementation of the first GST outcomes, is planned for COP31 in Antalya.[43] The first is the Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly and Equitable Manner (**TAFF Roadmap**). The International Conference on Fossil Fuel Transition, held for the first time in Santa Marta, Colombia, in April 2026 with the support of the Netherlands, played an important role in its development. The final analytical report of the conference[44] proposes five practical scenarios for the energy transition, focusing on overcoming barriers in clean energy supply chains and establishing flexible international coordination mechanisms for the phase-down of hydrocarbon production. The publication of the second

[37] Countries are required to submit the initial report (IR) no later than the time of providing authorization for the first transfer of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), or they may choose to combine the submission of the IR with their scheduled BTR. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (8 March 2022). *Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its third session, held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its third session* (FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1). Decision 2/CMA.3, Annex, Chapter IV.A, para. 18. URL

[38] Ibid. In the initial report, countries are required to provide information regarding the existence of a national registry for tracking carbon units, the methodology for applying corresponding adjustments to prevent double counting, and strategic information on how the planned approaches align with the objectives of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

[39] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (19 March 2019). *Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement* (FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2). Decision 18/CMA.1, Chapter VII. URL

[40] Notably, to date, not a single country has completed the process without receiving findings. The final outputs (Technical Expert Review Reports, TERRs) for each reviewed country contain recommendations and lists of areas for improvement to enhance reporting quality.

[41] As of September 2026, more than fifteen IRs were under consideration by technical teams in the official UNFCCC registry, while final review conclusions for eight pilot reports had been fully completed and published by experts. URL

[42] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (28 May 2026). *Options for funding the activities related to the infrastructure and processes under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement: Technical paper by the secretariat* (FCCC/TP/2026/2). URL

[43] The TAFF Roadmap supports the implementation of paragraph 28 of the first GST outcomes, which enshrined the commitment to "transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner" so as to achieve net zero by 2050. The Roadmap to Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation supports the implementation of paragraphs 33 and 34 of the first GST outcomes, which enshrined the global target of "halting and reversing forest loss and land degradation by 2030." URL

[44] Government of Colombia & Government of the Netherlands. (June 2026). *1st Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels: Report*. URL

initiative — the Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030 (Forest Roadmap) — is scheduled for autumn 2026. Earlier, in May 2026, at the 21st session of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF21) in New York, the Brazilian side presented[45] the key outlines of this document. According to the current draft,[46] the Forest Roadmap invites states to voluntarily develop national forest sector decarbonization pathways, considering regional specificities and the socio-economic interests of indigenous peoples. Although both initiatives are voluntary and are developing on the fringes of the multilateral process, their launch in Antalya is capable of stimulating discussions within the official negotiation tracks.

20. A new platform introduced in 2026 was the Trade and Climate Dialogues, agreed upon at COP30 in Belém[47] and aimed at examining the opportunities, challenges, and barriers to expanding international trade cooperation in the context of the climate agenda. Although the official cycle of three technical dialogues is scheduled to run until 2028, this track could find itself at the center of controversy at the Antalya conference. COP31 will consider an informal note by the co-chairs summarizing the outcomes of the first Bonn round, which could serve as a starting point for establishing a permanent official negotiation track within the UNFCCC framework.[48]

6. Presidency Priorities

21. A major institutional reform was the relaunch of the Global Climate Action Agenda (**GCAA**) — the United Nations platform for coordinating and scaling up the efforts of non-party stakeholders in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. The initiative is developing under the auspices of the UNFCCC as the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action.[49] Although GCAA initiatives formally fall outside the official negotiation process, they are capable of mobilizing action at the level of global investors and business.[50]

22. Starting from 2026, the GCAA will transition from an annual update of presidency priorities to a fixed medium-term cycle running until 2030.[51] The priorities of the presidency will now be structured around six cross-cutting themes,[52] based on the outcomes of the first GST, while the GCAA itself will receive a clear institutional structure.[53] In 2026, the co-chairs of COP31 in Antalya will present their practical action programme. It will link the cross-cutting themes of the GCAA with ten priority themes of the presidency.[54] Among the key vectors of this agenda, a special place

[45] COP30 Presidency. (June 2026). *Roadmap to halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.* URL

[46] Climate Policy Initiative (**CPI**). (17 July 2026). *Roadmap on halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 platform.* URL

[47] FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1. Decision 1/CMA.7, para. 57. URL

[48] During the first Trade and Climate Dialogue held in Bonn in 2026, a number of developing countries supported the initiative to establish a permanent official negotiating track on trade issues within the UNFCCC framework. URL

[49] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (31 January 2017). *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-second session, held in Marrakech from 7 to 18 November 2016. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-second session* (FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1). Decision 1/CP.22, para. 19. URL

[50] For instance, the Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance, managed by the CPI, was launched in 2014. Over 12 years, it has developed 87 financial solutions and instruments, helping mobilize $5 billion in climate investment for developing markets, including $1.9 billion in private investment. URL

[51] Climate High-Level Champions. (2026). *Global Climate Action Agenda 2026–2030: A five-year vision for accelerating implementation.* United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL

[52] The cross-cutting themes of the GCAA include energy, industry and transport; ecosystems and biodiversity; agriculture and food systems; cities, infrastructure and water resources; social development; finance, technology and capacity-building. URL

[53] High-Level Champions for Climate Action. (4 August 2026). *Global Climate Action Agenda: Terms of reference of the organizational structure*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL

[54] COP31 Press Office. (29 July 2026). *Türkiye's COP31 presentation at the Bonn Climate Change Conference*. COP31 Türkiye. URL

will be occupied by electrification issues[55] and the transition to a circular economy through Türkiye's flagship Zero Waste initiative.[56]

23. An additional, officially declared priority of the COP31 Presidency will be the topic of artificial intelligence and its intersection with energy and climate policy.[57] Within this framework, Türkiye, jointly with the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU), initiated the development of the Antalya Pledge on AI. The initiative aims to increase transparency regarding energy use by IT giants and stimulate the transition of data centers to renewable energy sources.

24. Furthermore, due to the unique co-leadership model of Australia and its close links with Pacific small island developing States, a separate track focused on the financial needs of the Pacific region is planned for launch. The focus will be on the capitalization and practical launch of the Pacific Resilience Facility (**PRF**). Unlike most global climate funds, the PRF provides support exclusively in the form of non-repayable grants, which reduces the debt burden on vulnerable economies. Having commenced operations in May 2026,[58] the fund transitioned to the stage of active capital mobilization. As of September 2026, the volume of mobilized funds had already reached
$172 million. A special high-level session will be organized at COP31 to mobilize the remaining capital to reach an initial target of $500 million by December 2026.[59]

25. In parallel, a large-scale advancement of the ocean agenda is expected within the official UNFCCC negotiation process. In particular, it is planned to approve a multi-year roadmap for the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue, the creation of which was recommended in the Secretariat's summary report[60] following the Bonn sessions in June 2026.

[55] Under the COP31 presidency, a target was established to increase the share of electricity in final global energy consumption to 35% by 2035.

[56] Türkiye's global Zero Waste initiative aims to halve the growth rate of global waste volumes and minimize methane emissions by 2035.

[57] Volcovici, V. (21 September 2026). *Turkey launches AI initiative ahead of COP31 climate summit. Reuters.* URL

[58] Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. (30 October 2025). *Agreement to Establish the Pacific Resilience Facility: Treaty being considered.* URL

[59] Wong, P., Ditoka, S. R., Bowen, C., Conroy, P. (6 May 2026). *Australia and Fiji ratify Pacific Resilience Facility Treaty*. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. URL

[60] Michael, S., Lenaerts, U. (31 August 2026). *Informal summary report of the ocean and climate change dialogue 2026*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL