Progress of ISDS Reform: Outcomes of the 55th Session of UNCITRAL Working Group III

From 12 to 16 October 2026, Anna Kozyakova and Sofia Sarenkova, representing the International and Comparative Law Research Center (ICLRC), attended the 55th session of UNCITRAL Working Group III in Vienna as observers. The session focused on the reform of the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Working Group III has been conducting this reform for nine years now, acting within the broad mandate granted to it by UNCITRAL.

Read about the progress of discussions within UNCITRAL Working Group III on our website:

Earlier, as part of the reform, UNCITRAL developed — and this summer adopted — a set of procedural provisions governing the conduct of proceedings in international investment disputes. These are intended to supplement the existing UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, taking into account the specific characteristics of ISDS.

On the agenda were the remaining draft provisions (DPs) on procedural and cross-cutting issues, intended for inclusion in investment treaties (A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.267), as well as draft guidelines on the calculation of damages and compensation (A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.255). Particular attention was devoted to draft provision 20 on assessment of damages and their compensation (A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.268).

Before the discussion began, participants held differing views on the level of support required to approve the draft provisions. Some delegates insisted that the content of the provisions should reflect a consensus within the Working Group. Others argued that a lack of broad support for specific provisions should not preclude their inclusion in the final text, as States could decide for themselves which ones to incorporate into their own investment treaties.

During the session, the Working Group considered 11 draft provisions: DP 11-bis (Consolidation of proceedings), DP 12-bis (Regulation of third-party funding), DP 14 (Local remedies), DP 15 (Waiver of rights to initiate adjudicatory dispute resolution proceedings), DP 16 (Limitation period), DP 17 (Denial of benefits), DP 18 (Shareholder claims on its own behalf), DP 18-bis (Shareholder claims on behalf of an enterprise), DP 19 (Right to regulate), DP 20 (Assessment of damages and compensation), and DP 21 (Joint interpretation). The participants’ desire to complete the consideration of these provisions as quickly as possible led to strict adherence to the rules of procedure.

The most significant outcome of the session was the compromise on a number of issues that have traditionally been a source of substantial disagreement in ISDS: the use of local remedies, limitation periods, shareholder claims, and the states’ right to regulate. Ultimately, the Working Group fully approved six draft provisions (DPs 14, 16, 18, 18-bis, 19, and 21). At the same time, concerns were raised in informal discussions — including among observers — that the approaches developed would shift the balance of rights and interests in favour of States, to the detriment of the protection afforded to foreign investors.

Regarding the other five draft provisions (DPs 11-bis, 12-bis, 15, 17, and 20), the delegates were able to reach an agreement on certain provisions; however, persistent disagreements among them prevented the completion of work on these provisions during this session. The search for a compromise is expected to continue — the Chair intends to present draft provisions for the Commission next summer.

The ICLRC plans to continue monitoring the progress of the reform and participating in discussions as an observer.

Further details regarding the discussion of specific draft provisions can be found below.

 

Access to ISDS and Prevention of Parallel Proceedings (DPs 11-bis, 14, 15, 16)

A significant part of the discussion was devoted to provisions aimed at streamlining investor access to international arbitration, preventing parallel proceedings, and enhancing the efficiency of ISDS.

Draft provision 11-bis provides for the possibility of consolidating multiple arbitration proceedings at the initiative of one of the parties. Such proceedings must be based on the same investment agreement, involve common questions of law or fact, and arise out of the same events or circumstances. This mechanism is intended to reduce procedural costs and lower the risk of conflicting decisions being issued.

The Working Group agreed upon the first five paragraphs of the draft, specifying the procedure for initiating the consolidation and the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. In particular, it was stipulated that a request for consolidation must be submitted immediately after the filing of the last of the claims for which consolidation is sought. Such a request is to be directed to the appointing authority designated by the investment agreement; in the absence of such an authority, or where different authorities are specified for the respective proceedings, it shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). If, within 30 days of receiving the request, the appointing authority — having consulted with the parties to the dispute — does not deem it manifestly unfounded, an arbitral tribunal shall be constituted to consider the consolidation.

Consideration of the remaining points, including those relating to the conditions for consolidation and the applicable procedural rules, has been deferred.

Draft provision 14 is intended to encourage the use of local remedies prior to resorting to international arbitration, without requiring that they be exhausted.

The draft provides for the suspension of the limitation period while a dispute is being considered by national courts or other competent authorities (such as administrative bodies). The delegates mostly disagreed on the duration of this suspension. Some participants argued that an investor should be granted sufficient time to exhaust all stages of national proceedings, including appeals to the court of last resort. Others pointed out that an excessively long suspension of the limitation period undermines legal certainty, as the respondent remains in a State of prolonged uncertainty regarding whether a claim might be brought to international arbitration against them.

As a result, the Working Group agreed on a compromise approach, under which the limitation period is suspended until a final decision is rendered by the relevant court or other competent authority of last resort, or until the proceedings are discontinued by the investor or the enterprise. In the absence of a final decision, the suspension is limited to five years, unless the investor and the State agree otherwise. Draft provision 14 was approved in its entirety.

Closely linked to DP 14, the draft provision 15 stipulates that an investor, upon initiating international arbitration, shall waive its right to commence or continue other proceedings concerning the same matter. This mechanism aims to prevent the parallel adjudication of disputes in both national and international courts. The participants also agreed on the core elements of the provision, including, in particular, exceptions for proceedings aimed at obtaining interim measures, as well as for certain categories of proceedings initiated by the respondent State. Two issues remain unresolved: whether the waiver requirement extends to persons affiliated with the investor, and whether such a waiver retains its legal effect if an investment claim is dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds.

The Working Group also agreed on draft provision 16 on the limitation period for commencing arbitration. A three-year period was supported, which the parties may extend or suspend by agreement. The delegates also considered other grounds for the suspension of the limitation period. Ultimately, the Working Group decided not to include in the draft a separate paragraph regarding the automatic suspension of the limitation period during amicable settlement or use of local remedies. This decision took into account, among other things, the existence of specific provisions addressing these matters in other draft provisions, as well as the possibility of extending or suspending the limitation period by the parties’ agreement.

Regulation of Third-Party Funding in ISDS (DP 12-bis)

The Working Group is developing several provisions to regulate various aspects of third-party funding (TPF) in arbitration. A provision regarding the grounds for and scope of TPF disclosure has already been adopted; currently, the primary focus is on DP 12-bis (Limitation of the TPF) and DP 17 (Denial of benefits if an investor continues to receive TPF that has been limited).

DP 12-bis defines the grounds and procedures for its limitation, as well as the consequences of failing to comply with the relevant requirements.

During the negotiations, disagreements arose regarding the permissible limits of tribunal intervention in relations between investors and funders. Some delegations advocated for stricter regulation. They pointed out, in particular, that TPF could lead to an increase of the ISDS claims — including those concerning measures taken by States in the public interest — thereby exerting a chilling effect on the exercise of their regulatory powers. Others emphasized the need to preserve investors’ access to justice, particularly in cases where filing a claim would be impossible without TPF. Concerns were also raised as to whether a tribunal’s requirement for the funded party to amend or terminate its TPF agreement might exceed the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Following discussions and informal consultations, a compromise text was developed that empowers the tribunal — at the request of one of the parties — to limit the TPF in three scenarios:

1.     if the funder has the authority to make decisions regarding the conduct of the proceedings, including their termination, settlement, or the selection of representatives and experts;

2.     if the funder has the right to terminate the TPF without prior notice; or

3.     if the TPF was provided in bad faith or poses a threat to the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings. When assessing the latter ground, the tribunal must consider, in particular, the necessity of TPF for bringing the claim, its potential impact on the respondent State’s ability to adopt or maintain measures aimed at achieving legitimate public policy objectives, and the proportionality of the funder’s remuneration relative to the amount of funding provided.

If violations are identified, a funding agreement is no longer necessarily subject to termination. Instead, its terms can first be amended; if that is not possible, or if a relevant requirement is not met, the agreement may then be terminated.

The Working Group has approved DP 12-bis. However, certain issues remain open:

  • The wording for one of the grounds for imposing limitations on TPF has not been finalized; the choice between the criteria of “bad faith” and “abusive conduct” has been left for further consideration.
  • It has not yet been decided whether to include a requirement for the funded party to return any unspent funds and to submit a relevant financial report to the arbitral tribunal.

Shareholder Claims and Prevention of Double Recovery (DPs 18 and 18-bis)

The Working Group has concluded its consideration of two interrelated draft provisions governing the shareholder claims. Draft provision 18 concerns claims brought by shareholders on their own behalf, while Draft provision 18-bis addresses claims brought by a shareholder on behalf of an enterprise incorporated in the respondent State. Distinguishing between these two categories of claims can help avoid the duplication of claims and reduce the risk of double recovery for the same damage.

With respect to DP 18-bis, the delegates primarily disagreed on the criteria for the ownership or control of an enterprise. They addressed the possibility of requiring ownership of more than 50% of an enterprise’s capital, as well as granting a group of minority shareholders the right to bring a claim on its behalf. Ultimately, the Working Group decided against further specifying these criteria in Paragraph 1, instead adopting language that entitles a shareholder to bring a claim on behalf of the enterprise, provided that the enterprise is registered in the respondent State. At the same time, the requirement to submit evidence confirming that a shareholder holds ownership rights in, or control over, an enterprise has been retained.

The inclusion in DP 18-bis a requirement for both the shareholder and the relevant enterprise to waive parallel proceedings regarding the same matter sparked a separate discussion. Although it was suggested that this might duplicate DP 15, the Working Group decided to keep the requirement, as the draft provisions are intended to be capable of independent application.

Both drafts were approved in their entirety — the Working Group decided to retain them as separate, independent provisions. At the same time, the delegates emphasized that it would be desirable to adopt DP 18 in conjunction with DP 18-bis, in order to ensure a coherent regulatory approach to the various types of shareholder claims.

Limits on Investment Protection and the States’ Regulatory Powers (DP 17,
DP 19)

Denial Investors of Benefits Granted under an Investment Agreement (DP 17)

One of the most contentious discussions centered on DP 17. It allows a State to deny investors the protections — both substantive and procedural — stipulated in an investment agreement.

This DP aims, among other things, to counter the use of shell companies and the abusive structuring of investments aimed at gaining access to ISDS.

The Working Group reached an agreement on Paragraph 1 of DP 17, which allows to deny benefits to enterprises that are owned or controlled by certain categories of persons and do not conduct substantial commercial activity within the territory of the host State.

The participants were unable to reach a consensus regarding additional grounds for denial of benefits — such as violations of domestic law, corruption, fraud, and deceitful conduct by investors (Paragraph 3 of DP 17).

Speaking on Paragraph 3, ICLRC drew attention to the risk of duplicating legal mechanisms designed to counter illegal investments, corruption, fraud, and deceitful conduct in the context of the financing of investment disputes. These issues are already addressed by existing investment treaties, taken into account in arbitration practice, and covered within the scope of other draft provisions — specifically, DP 10 (Counterclaims), DP 12-bis (Third-party funding), and DP 20 (Assessment of damages and compensation).

Introducing a mechanism to deny treaty benefits as an additional response to the same set of circumstances would create legal uncertainty and could lead to contradictions between the decisions of the respondent State and the tribunal. Of particular concern is the possibility that such benefits could be denied at a late stage of the proceedings, and with retroactive effect. Furthermore, if this mechanism was applied — for instance, in cases involving violations related to TPF — an investor could lose all protection under the treaty. Such consequences could be disproportionate, especially if the TPF had already been limited.

ICLRC further highlighted the need to establish appropriate standards of proof for corruption and fraud, should the grounds for the denial of benefits be retained. Such circumstances should be assessed by an arbitral tribunal through an examination of the evidence; this would ensure greater legal certainty and the robustness of the decisions reached, both in subsequent setting-aside and enforcement proceedings.

In this regard, ICLRC advocated for addressing these issues within the specifically established legal mechanisms, rather than expanding the grounds for the denial of treaty-based benefits.

Following the discussion, the Working Group ruled out the possibility of denying an investor of treaty benefits in cases where a tribunal has already restricted the TPF. This avoids duplication with the DP 12-bis. Provisions on the denial of treaty benefits due to serious violations of the host State’s laws — or due to corruption, fraud, or deceit in the making of an investment — have been placed in square brackets for further deliberation. In particular, the Working Group will consider whether to move these provisions into a separate, standalone draft provision, designated as DP 17-bis.

The question of whether the content of this draft falls within the mandate of Working Group III has also resurfaced. A number of delegations took the view that defining the scope of investors entitled to treaty-based protection pertains to the substantive regulation of investments and lies beyond the remit of procedural reform. Other participants pointed to the Working Group’s broad mandate and the need to address identified shortcomings in the existing ISDS system.

Consequently, it was decided to refer the question of whether the draft provision aligns with the Working Group’s mandate to UNCITRAL for consideration. Work on Paragraphs 2–4 of DP 17 was deferred.

Right to Regulate (DP 19)

An important outcome of the session was the completion of work on Draft Provision 19, which concerns the right of a State to regulate. This provision reflects an effort to strike a balance between protecting foreign investments and the freedom of States to pursue policy measures in the public interest.

Previously, the Working Group developed two alternative formulations for DP 19. Option A stipulated that arbitrators shall take into account a State’s right to regulate when assessing an alleged breach of an investment agreement. Option B provided that investors would be precluded from challenging certain State measures in arbitration — specifically those adopted in good faith, which are non-discriminatory, and which are aimed at achieving legitimate public policy objectives.

A significant number of delegations supported Option A, viewing it as a more balanced approach; it does not preclude an investor from seeking arbitration, yet it ensures that the State’s regulatory authority is taken into account when a dispute is being considered. At the same time, some delegations questioned the drafting of Option A — specifically the content and practical application of the standard of deference to a State’s regulatory authority, as well as the requirement for a tribunal to “take into account” the high level of deference that international law generally extends to a State’s right to regulate.

These issues were also highlighted by the Centre in its analysis of the draft provision; it drew attention to the ambiguity of the proposed standard of deference and the lack of clarity regarding the practical application of this standard. Furthermore, the wording “shall take into account” failed to establish clear limits on the tribunal’s assessment, leaving the arbitrators with a significant degree of discretion.

The Working Group approved a compromise version of DP 19, under which, “[w]hen assessing the alleged breach by a Contracting Party of its obligation under the Agreement, the Tribunal shall take into account the State’s inherent right to set its legislative and regulatory priorities and to regulate to protect legitimate policy objectives.”

Thus, the final version does not establish a certain standard of deference toward a State’s regulatory decisions, nor does it specify the weight a tribunal should assign to this factor when assessing an alleged breach. The extent to which this wording will foster predictability and consistency in arbitration practice remains an open question.

Assessment of Damages and Compensation (DP 20)

One of the most complex issues addressed during the session was the discussion of Draft Provision 20, which concerns the assessment of damages and compensation in investment disputes. The Working Group examined a revised version of the draft, prepared in light of the intersessional meeting held in Ninh Binh, Viet Nam. Key points of contention included the calculation of interest, the standards of proof for damages, and the appropriateness of forward-looking (predictive) valuation methodologies.

In particular, the delegates discussed the possibility of establishing a general rule for the accrual of simple interest at a reasonable risk-free rate, while allowing for other rates or calculation methods where there are sufficient grounds for doing so. Proponents of this approach emphasized the need to prevent excessive compensation for damages, whereas others pointed to the risk of incomplete compensation — for instance, in cases where the risk-free rate falls below the rate of inflation. Certain points of disagreement arose regarding: 1) the extent of an arbitral tribunal’s discretion in awarding interest, 2) the standard of proof required to justify the use of alternative rates or calculation methods, and 3) the distinction between interest accrued before and after the issuance of an arbitral award. It was not possible to reach an agreement on the relevant provisions.

Significant attention was devoted to the discounted cash flow method and other valuation techniques based on forecasting future earnings. Some delegations advocated limiting their application — specifically to instances where there is verifiable data on the profitability of investments from prior periods. Other participants noted that such a restriction would unjustifiably narrow the arbitral tribunal’s discretion. In their view, future earnings can be estimated with a reasonable degree of certainty even in the absence of a proven track record of investment profitability — for instance, by drawing on the terms of concession agreements or other long-term contracts.

Disagreements also persisted regarding the standard of proof for future damages. Discussions touched upon requirements that the compensation sought must not be speculative, that its amount must be established with a reasonable degree of certainty, and that a stricter “clear and convincing evidence” standard should apply when predictive valuation methods are used. In addition, the possibility of limiting the amount of compensation to the sum of expenses actually incurred in making the investments was considered. Proponents of such a limitation pointed to increased predictability in compensation decisions, while opponents highlighted the risk of incomplete recovery for damages, as well as the conflation of concepts such as investment expenditures, the value of an investment, and the quantum of damages incurred.

The Working Group has successfully agreed upon rules for establishing a causal link between a breach of an investment treaty and the resulting damage. According to the approved wording of Paragraph 3, compensation is limited to damage that would not have occurred but for the breach and was caused directly as a result of it. When determining the amount of compensation, the arbitral tribunal must also take into account, where applicable, any fault on the part of the investor or the enterprise, their failure to take reasonable measures to mitigate the damage, and any revocation or modification of the contested measure by the State.

At the conclusion of the session, the Working Group approved Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 of DP 20. Consideration of Paragraphs 2 and 4 — including issues related to the accrual of interest and the use of forward-looking valuation methodologies — was deferred. The Working Group did not have time to address Paragraphs 6 and 7.

The Working Group also discussed the procedure for further work on the draft guidelines on the calculation of damages and compensation in investor-State dispute settlement (A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.255). States were invited to submit written comments to the Secretariat.

Joint Interpretations of Investment Agreements (DP 21)

The Working Group has completed its review of Draft Provision 21. It allows the States party to an investment treaty to adopt joint interpretations regarding its interpretation, which are binding upon arbitral tribunals.

Particular attention was paid to the temporal application of joint interpretations — specifically, their applicability to ongoing arbitration proceedings and their impact on previously rendered awards. Following the discussion, the Working Group approved a draft provision stating that joint interpretations are binding regardless of when proceedings commenced, but do not affect final arbitral awards already issued. Paragraph 4, which addressed specific aspects of the temporal application of joint interpretations, was deleted.

In the Centre’s view, it remains unclear how the adoption of a joint interpretation might affect interim decisions previously rendered by arbitral tribunals, including those concerning jurisdiction (see the ICLRC note on this topic). Specifically, it is uncertain whether such a new interpretation could serve as a basis for revisiting an issue on which a tribunal has already issued an interim decision. As became clear from a brief discussion, the delegations prefer to keep the provisions in general terms, without going into detail.  Despite a certain degree of uncertainty arising from this approach, it will at the same time preserve the arbitrators’ discretion regarding how to apply Provision 21 and any joint interpretations issued by the parties to the treaty.