United Nations General Assembly Resolution 80/263 in Support of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on States’ Climate Obligations

Introduction

On 20 May 2026, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting the advisory opinion on States’ climate obligations rendered by the International Court of Justice on 23 July 2025 (the General Assembly and the Court, respectively).¹ The negotiating process that culminated in the adoption of the resolution was initiated by the Pacific island State of Vanuatu, which led diplomatic efforts from 2019 to 2023 to secure the Court’s advisory opinion. The resolution became the first major international instrument to translate the Court’s legal findings on States’ climate obligations into the political sphere.² However, as the resolution was developed between February and May 2026, many of its original ambitions were diluted. Although it was adopted by an overwhelming majority — 141 votes in favour, 8 against, and 28 abstentions³ — it was criticized by several major States. The prospects for the process that it has launched remain uncertain, but by no means hopeless.

Content of the Resolution

First, the resolution welcomes the Court’s advisory opinion and affirms its importance as an authoritative contribution to clarifying existing international law.⁴ Although not all of the Court’s conclusions may appear self-evident, it should be emphasized that the Court and other international courts do not create new law; they can only clarify the law as it exists. This is how the overwhelming majority of States perceive the Court’s opinion.

The resolution also recognizes that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement are the principal intergovernmental forums for agreeing on ways to address climate change,⁵ but that they do not displace other rules of international law in this field.⁶ Against this background, the resolution calls upon all States to comply with the obligations to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment, as identified by the Court. In particular, it highlights the obligations to prevent significant environmental harm, to cooperate in preventing such harm, and to respect human rights in the context of climate change.⁷

In a separate paragraph, the resolution calls upon the parties to the Paris Agreement to comply with their obligations under the Agreement, as identified by the Court, and to take measures to achieve the temperature goal of limiting warming to 1.5 °C. The measures listed include tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling the global average annual rate of energy-efficiency improvements by 2030; transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems with a view to achieving net zero by 2050; and phasing out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that do not address energy poverty or support a just transition.⁸ Notably, the Court itself did not refer to these measures. This language comes from the first global stocktake agreed by the parties to the Paris Agreement at the Conference of the Parties in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in 2023.⁹

The resolution then recalls the Court’s conclusion that States are not required to update charts showing the location of their baselines and the outer limits of their maritime zones in the context of sea-level rise.¹⁰ It also recalls the Court’s conclusion that, once a State has been established, the loss of one of its constituent elements — for example, its territory — does not necessarily entail the termination of its existence. At the end of the same paragraph, however, the General Assembly went beyond merely reproducing the Court’s cautious and open-ended conclusion that such loss ‘does not necessarily entail’ termination.¹¹ Instead, it sent a more definite message by expressly affirming the ‘continuity of statehood in the face of sea-level rise’.¹²

In concluding its exposition of the Court’s findings, the resolution recalls that a State’s breach of its climate obligations, as identified by the Court, gives rise to international responsibility. The responsible State remains bound by the obligation breached and must: (i) perform it, if performance is still possible; (ii) cease the breach, if it is continuing; (iii) provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, where appropriate; and (iv) make reparation for injury caused to affected States.¹³ These consequences also arise from breaches of other international obligations and in that sense reflect an already established standard.¹⁴

An important element of the resolution is its request that the United Nations Secretary-General submit, during the General Assembly’s eighty-second session, which will open in September 2027, a report identifying ‘ways to advance compliance’ with all the obligations identified by the Court. In preparing the report, the Secretary-General is to take account of scientific evidence and possible gaps in multilateral efforts to address climate change in accordance with international law. This work is to be carried out in consultation with United Nations Member States, without prejudice to their legal positions, without attributing responsibility, and in a manner complementary to existing mechanisms, including those under the UNFCCC.¹⁵ The General Assembly also decided to include in the agenda of its eighty-third session, which will open in September 2028, an item on the follow-up to the advisory opinion.¹⁶

Changes during the Drafting Process

The content of the resolution changed substantially as it was developed.

Earlier drafts contained far-reaching proposals regarding the follow-up work. In particular, they proposed establishing an international register of climate-related harm and considering ways to facilitate the resolution of reparation claims, possibly through a new mechanism under the auspices of the General Assembly. They also referred to obligations to support developing countries as part of the broader duty to cooperate, whereas the final text merely mentions the duty to cooperate without any detail. The earlier drafts did not contain language from the global stocktake on renewable energy and energy efficiency, although, like the final text, they did call for phasing out inefficient subsidies and transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems. Finally, they included separate paragraphs and subparagraphs on greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, ‘climate migrants’, and colonialism as a manifestation of injustice that exacerbates vulnerability to climate change.

These changes appear to have been necessary to secure support for the resolution from a substantial number of developed States, particularly European States. Most of the elements omitted from the final text — reparation, support for developing countries, climate migrants, and colonialism — raise issues that are especially sensitive for European States (though some are also sensitive for other States). At the same time, the elements absent from earlier drafts but included in the final text — renewable energy and energy efficiency — also reflect the priorities of the European climate agenda.

Reactions of States

Eight States voted against the resolution: Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, and Yemen. Twenty-eight States abstained, including Argentina, Ethiopia, India, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, and Türkiye. A further 16 States, including Azerbaijan, Serbia, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, were absent from the vote altogether. The remaining 141 United Nations Member States voted in favour. The principal objections raised by States voting against the resolution concerned: (i) disagreement with the Court’s underlying findings and the selective inclusion of some findings, but omission of others; (ii) the inclusion of elements not contained in the Court’s advisory opinion; and (iii) the further involvement of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General in this area.¹⁷

Criticism of the Court’s underlying findings largely repeated the positions that the same States had previously presented before the Court. Some, for example, criticized the Court for placing excessive emphasis on the customary-law obligation to prevent significant environmental harm in the context of climate change, arguing that States’ climate obligations are contained exclusively in three specialized treaties: the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement.¹⁸

Moreover, although the Court’s advisory opinion also addressed States’ obligations relating to adaptation and the provision of support, the resolution does not mention them. Similarly, the excerpts from the global stocktake included in the resolution concern only fossil fuels, energy, and net zero. In other words, they relate solely to mitigation,but not to adaptation or provision of support to developing countries. The resolution thus received criticism for lacking balance: it places disproportionate emphasis on mitigation while neglecting other areas of international climate policy.

Finally, the request that the Secretary-General prepare a report on ways to advance compliance with the climate obligations identified by the Court received a mixed response. Although the request is subject to numerous conditions and qualifications,¹⁹ some States expressed concern that it would launch, under the auspices of the General Assembly, a process parallel to the UNFCCC framework, thereby increasing the fragmentation of global climate cooperation and consuming the United Nations’ already limited resources.

On the one hand, some of the criticism of the resolution may be justified, particularly as regards the imbalance and fragmentation. On the other hand, the efforts of small island States to identify or create new and more productive forms of cooperation are also understandable, given that the principal climate forum — the UNFCCC — has failed over more than three decades to meet their aspirations. These States are likely to continue their diplomatic campaign in various multilateral forums in the foreseeable future. Its prospects are uncertain because the initiative faces opposition from a number of influential States. Yet it is by no means hopeless. If the voting results any indication, the overwhelming majority of both developed and developing States are at least willing to see how the process unfolds. The Court has given island States confidence that international law is on their side, while the General Assembly has reinforced that confidence through broad political support and the prospect of creating new working formats if existing ones fail to deliver. This is a potentially powerful lever in the negotiating process and should not be overlooked.